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Abstract: The debate about justice in immigration seems somehow stagnated given that it seems
justice requires both further exclusion and more porous borders. In the face of this, I propose to take a
step back and to realize that the general problem of borders—to determine what kind of borders liberal
democracies ought to have—gives rise to two particular problems: first, to justify exclusive control
over the administration of borders (the problem of legitimacy of borders) and, second, to specify how
this control ought to be exercised (the problem of justice of borders). The literature has explored the
second but ignored the first. Therefore, I propose a different approach to the ethics of immigration by
focusing on concerns of legitimacy in a three-step framework: first, identifying the kind of authority
or power that immigration controls exercise; second, redefining borders as international and domestic
institutions that issue that kind of power; and finally, considering supranational institutions that
redistribute the right to exclude among legitimate borders.
Keywords: distributive justice; political legitimacy; international legitimacy; liberal theory of
international relations; immigration; political self-determination; territorial rights; nationalism; statism
1. Introduction
For some exclusionist liberal political theorists, the conception of social justice among residents
and citizens provides reasons for excluding would-be immigrants, so borders should remain closed
until we have enough reason to admit someone (Miller 2016; Wellman and Cole 2011). However,
some other inclusionist theorists believe that justice requires just the opposite: porous borders that
remain open until we have sufficiently strong reason to exclude someone (Carens 2013; Kukathas 2005;
Wellman and Cole 2011). This seems insufficient if we have to believe that social justice may require
both inclusion and exclusion at the same time.
In spite of this, I propose to take a step back to the domain of global ethics and the ethics of
international relations. From there, if distributive justice matters, then maybe the permission to exclude
would-be immigrants should be distributed, not from the point of social justice alone but from the
holistic view of global ethics. However, I arrive there following three steps of analysis. In the first stage,
instead of asking what justice requires from our border institutions, I suggest asking first a logically
prior question: At the level of our most basic moral principles, what kind of authority is it permissible
that borders exercise? This, I believe, is the question of legitimacy. Secondly, we realize that borders are
not only lines in the ground or the limits of our institutions but also institutions themselves. Borders are
the institutions which carry out the authority of border controls over would-be immigrants. These sui
generis institutions are not only domestic and, therefore, subject to standards of distributive justice for
residents and citizens but also international and subject to standards of international legitimacy that
Soc. Sci. 2019, 8, 238; doi:10.3390/socsci8080238 www.mdpi.com/journal/socsci
Soc. Sci. 2019, 8, 238 2 of 19
should take the interest of outsiders into account. This account of borders allows to weigh together
social justice and global ethics, so it may show us under what conditions it will be morally permissible
for borders to prioritize the interest of residents and citizens over the interest of would-be immigrants.
Thirdly, once we draw the contours of the legitimate use of border authority, we can again ask whether
it is appropriate to distribute the right to exclude immigrants according to standards of distributive
international justice by means of an international border institution.
This approach has the potential to deflate the tension between inclusionists and exclusionists
because the three stages may identify the kind of stances of border authority we typically use to protect
relationships of justice between citizens and residents that are nonetheless morally impermissible
from the point of view of international legitimacy and that, therefore, should be avoided. Here, I do
not provide a substantive answer to the problem of what morality, all-things-considered, requires
from immigration controls. Neither will I make a substantive case for exclusion or inclusion. Instead,
I merely outline the contours of an alternative way to frame the problem by assembling three somewhat
different approaches. I identify the problem by means of a critical interpretation: the conflation of
concerns of justice and concerns of legitimacy may hinder the incorporation of the interest and rights of
potential immigrants in the justification of immigration controls. This interpretative thesis is supported
by evidence gathered by a conceptual analysis of the conceptions of legitimacy and justice. Finally, my
three-step approach employs the deontological approach of applied ethics, global ethics, or the ethics
of international relations.
The paper is structured as follows. In Section 2, I will explain how the literature about justice in
immigration has reached an impasse by distinguishing between exclusionist and inclusionist accounts
of immigration policy and the conflictive requirements of justice in each case. In Section 3, I will
distinguish legitimacy and justice as two different virtues or evaluations of political institutions and
how they are intermingled in what we call political justice in the postrawlsean literature. Section 3, in
turn, shows how political justice is embedded in the conventional view of the ethics of immigration.
This is important because, while contemporary political theory often takes them as the same evaluation,
there is a marked tendency in the exclusionist literature of justice in immigration to insist that what
justice for citizens and residents requires from our border controls is also a legitimate use of power
over outsiders. I also try to explain how this is wrong in the sense that exclusionist justifications of
immigration controls normally beg the question by assuming that borders are legitimate and that
states have a legitimate claim over their territories. In Section 4, I lay down my three-step approach
to problems of the ethics of immigration. I explain how a political conception of legitimacy may
be applied to the authority that borders typically exercise. I also scratch my conception of borders
and the different sources from where border institutions may draw legitimacy from. Hopefully, my
“alternative new normative start” provides a more coherent view of what morality requires from our
border institutions. Finally, in Section 5, I deal with two possible objections to my three-step approach.
From the outset, some clarifications are needed. Firstly, I am only concerned with borders of liberal
democracies. This is because the institutions of these kind of states are permeable to moral principles
such as human rights, equal citizenship, and some form of equality of opportunity. Elsewhere, I have
argued how the moral character of liberal democracies implies that borders, too. should be understood
as institutions permeable to these kind of principles (Camacho 2016). There is, of course, a more general
narrative that tells us about how states and borders came about (Castañeda and Schneider 2017), but
there is also a narrative that tells us how states and borders may change. This paper is about the second
kind of narratives and issues as we may find them in the liberal ethics of international relations.
Secondly, among would-be immigrants, there are several categories with different needs and
dissimilarities (Miller 2016). For example, most exclusionist writers believe that refugees have a very
strong moral claim to be admitted, grounded in their most basic needs (Miller 2016; Carens 2013;
Wellman and Cole 2011). Presumably, each case may offer its own reasons to limit or expand the right
to exclude. However, I worry that, in difficult cases, most of the normative work is performed by the
vulnerability and urgency of the case and not by the relationship between citizens, residents, land,
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institutions, and potential immigrants. It seems to me that a good approach to the ethics of immigration
needs to first make an account of that complex relationship between those elements above and, after
that, to work out the difficult cases. Therefore, by holding constant further complicating factors, I wish
to isolate the normative core of claims to exclude (Fine and Sangiovanni 2015). In order to do that,
I will focus only on the claim to admission and the interest of exclusion that is typically recognized as
the weakest: would-be immigrants who wish to be admitted because they want different opportunities
to work, to acquire skills, or to engage in forms of culture or religion or ways of caring about others that
are not available in their countries of origin, etc. They are not refugees, they are not seeking to reunite
with family members, and they are not suffering severe economic or other deprivation or, indeed,
suffering any substantive and systematic violation of rights where they live. They could very well
remain home, but they simply wish to improve their expectations, experiences, and options. Similarly,
I assume that the right of exclusion is not the result of a state of crisis from the part of receiving
states (Camacho 2017). They are not suffering from a financial crash or debt burdens, their labour
markets are not overflowing, they are not flawed states without political order and just institutions,
they are not facing terrorist threats or another sort of security crisis, and so on. They simply wish to
secure the protection of their citizens’ wellbeing, particularly of the worst-off or the more vulnerable
(Macedo 2018). I will call this “the core case”. Proceeding in this way may be problematic, but I focus
on this group mainly because the aim of the paper is to establish some guidelines to frame questions of
immigration; therefore, taking up the weakest case for inclusion/exclusion and to determine under what
conditions, if any, states/would-be immigrants even have a pro tanto right to exclude/being included
should be helpful for drawing an approach that could later consider the possibility of whether states or
would-be immigrants may have an all-things-considered case (Fine and Sangiovanni 2015, p. 194). If my
three-step approach here is sound, then later, each step needs to be developed further. Most obviously,
my account of borders and the legitimate claims over the land need to be given substantive content.
However, future work will develop this.
2. The Conventional View about Immigration: A Critical View
Consider first the pro tanto case for exclusion as a requirement of justice. Roughly, many liberals
endorse the version that follows:
Exclusionism: Justice not only permits but even requires exclusionary borders with the pro tanto
right to exclude would-be immigrants because citizens have a legitimate claim over the almost
exclusive enjoyment of their opportunities and advantages grounded in a strong case of political
self-determination.
A people or a group of citizens gain or lose rights of political self-determination in virtue of
how they stand together in a special, intrinsically valuable relationship to one another provided that,
together, they have developed institutional devices for protecting their own rights and freedoms
and effective forms of mutual care. According to exclusionists, these relationships of justice among
members may be jeopardized if outsiders are let in because outsiders are not entitled to the benefits
and opportunities created by these relationships of justice across generations.1 This provides states
1 For instance, in the Law of Peoples, Rawls stated that it is not permitted to migrate into other people’s territory without
consent and that the state is the agent qualified to enforce this: “an important role of government, however arbitrary a
society’s boundaries may appear from a historical point of view, is to be the representative and effective agent of a people
as they take responsibility for their territory and its environmental integrity, as well as for the size of their population.”
(Rawls 2001a, p. 38). This intuition is supported by the justness of private property: “Unless a definite agent is given
responsibility for maintaining an asset and bears the responsibility and loss for not doing so, that asset tends to deteriorate.
On my account the role of the institution of property is to prevent this deterioration from occurring. In the present case, the
asset is the people’s territory and its potential capacity to support them in perpetuity and the agent is the people itself as
politically organized. The perpetuity condition is crucial. People must recognize that they cannot make up for failing to
regulate their numbers or to care for their land by conquest in war, or by migrating into another people’s territory without
their consent.” (Rawls 2001a, p. 8).
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with a good case for restricting immigration.2 Roughly, David Miller and Christopher Heath Wellman,
among others, endorse this view.3 The problem with exclusionism is that some other liberals extract
different conclusions from standards of political justice. Consider the following position:
Inclusionists: Justice requires vastly porous borders because all humanity has a legitimate claim
over certain forms of international freedom of movement and association or certain forms of global
equality of opportunities. As a result, the relevant set of individuals where relationships of justice
must be established is in principle unbounded or is global in scope.
Under inclusionism, duties between citizens and their case of self-determination do not have
to necessarily outweigh their general duties to would-be immigrants provided that they also stand
in a special relationship with all other human beings. Joseph Carens, Chandra Kukathas, Philip
Cole, and Matthias Risse are the central proponents of this view. Both sides are vulnerable to many
objections, which will be discussed later in Section 4. For now, notice that, from these positions,
immigration poses the following contradiction: there are, on both sides of the border, individuals with
basic interests and powerful reasons for exclusion or inclusion, so it is not clear what justice requires
from immigration restrictions.4 Do citizens of affluent states have the right to benefit from the status
quo at the cost of immigrants? Do immigrants have the right to participate in the institutions and
benefits that distant others have created over generations? What can we make of this contradiction?
One possible critical interpretation is that considerations of justice are not very good by themselves in
adjudicating controversies about immigration policies. By means of conceptual analysis, I will try to
support this interpretation and argue that the contradiction above is in part the result of the conflation
between evaluations of justice and evaluations of legitimacy even though this conflation is pervasive
on contemporary political theory.
Even though philosophers still disagree greatly about the conceptual distinction, they agree that,
as a concept, justice is concerned with what we owe to whom. They also agree that the other central
question of politics often identified with legitimacy is to discern when political power is justified in order
to be seen as authoritative and bonding in a way compatible with basic freedoms.5 To sum up, we can
make the following distinction: an institution has the following political virtues:
legitimacy when it takes decisions in the name of others and uses coercive power to enforce those
decisions, providing reasons that bind those subjected to those decisions. This entails that those
subjected to the institutional decisions would be wrong to resist those decisions. (Williams 2005)
justice when it gives to everyone involved in the institutional framework and scope of action what
they are entitled to. Typically, this means that it distributes the burdens and advantages of cooperation
within the institutional scope. (Barry 1991)
2 Exclusion of outsiders is conditional to considerations of human rights. This means that exclusion needs to give equal
concern to the demands and needs of outsiders, so the putative right to exclude has many qualifications, that is why it
is a pro tanto right. Justice has many currencies. From the point of view of exclusionists, distributive justice is the standard
appropriate for treating citizens, but equal concern only demands the respect for human rights regarding international
relations. See (Cohen 2004; Beitz 2011) for discussion.
3 They, of course, have different and opposing views about what considerations of justice count. Miller is largely concerned
with cultural justice or associative obligations between members of the same cultural nation, while Wellman is concerned
with rights of association. However, despite their different starting points, both share the view that the value of political
self-determination and the interest that members have with it is such that it trumps the interest of outsiders to a certain extent.
4 This way of distinguishing theories of immigration may be controversial. One reason is that a given account may not fit
perfectly into my two simplifications. However, for the purpose of this paper, these simplifications help us to focus in the
standards we use to assess immigration restrictions. Later, I will come back to my simplifications and explain how they are
related to the debate of immigration in the broader field of global ethics.
5 For instance, Hobbes and Locke were more interested in reconciliating authority with human liberty by means of justification
than in the secondary (for them) problem of the moral quality of coercive power (Hobbes 1968, pp. 161, 183, 126, 190;
Locke [1689] 1988, pp. 210, 280, 293). Kant, on the other hand, believed that the problem of justifying political authority was
not different from the problem of its quality because the function of the state was, in the end, to protect our rights in the
sense of creating and sustaining just institutions (Kant [1781] 1991). Therefore, in a sense for Kant, the state’s legitimacy was
grounded in its ability to bring about justice (Kant [1781] 1991, pp. 408–10; MM Ak 6, pp. 255–56).
Soc. Sci. 2019, 8, 238 5 of 19
These very general concepts of justice and legitimacy may be narrowed down for the specific moral
character of liberal democracies (Scanlon 1998; Barry 1991; Rawls 2001b). Legitimacy concerns who is
entitled (and to what extent) to take decisions in the name and interest of others, and justice concerns
the distribution of burdens and benefits from social cooperation (Valentini 2012; Quong 2011; Rawls 2001b).
Now, notice that, under this distinction, the basic structure of liberal societies is one familiar case where
both standards may be conceptually co-extensional in the sense of applying greatly to the same object
(Sleat 2015; Rossi 2014; Song 2012; Peter 2009; Simmons 2001).6 As a result, it is not at all surprising
that most philosophers have regarded standards of legitimacy and justice as the same evaluation
(Valentini 2012; Simmons 1999). For instance, according to Valentini, political justice collapses the
underlining concerns of legitimacy and justice by indicating the different requirements of equal concern
under different circumstances: Legitimacy tells us when institutions may permissibly coerce us, while
justice determines what institutions owe to those coerced (Valentini 2012, pp. 97, 594). For simplicity,
I will call political justice the view that collapses justice and legitimacy as the same evaluation.
Now after this conceptual refinement, we can restate the question of the last section: What does
political justice—legitimacy and justice together—demand from our border institutions? Does political
justice require harder borders or rather more porous ones? I will argue that this tension between
conflicting claims of justice coming from exclusionism and inclusionism are in part the result of the
overlapping of concerns of justice and concerns of legitimacy. I will argue as well that this flaw in the
approach may be overcome by my three-step approach.
3. Residents, Citizens, and Land
We often believe unreflectively that the interest and rights of valuable political communities
involve analytically controlling the land. In order words, we believe that what justifies the state justifies
its authority over its borders and the territory within. In this section, I will show that the conventional
account of justice in immigration—exclusionists and inclusionists—fail to offer a principled connection
between political communities and land. On one hand, exclusionism takes into account the interest of
residents and citizens but begs the question of the grounds of an immigration policy. Inclusionism, on
the other hand, takes into account the relationship between borders and land but fails to give right
weight to the claims and concerns of would-be immigrants and political communities here and now.
From this, I hope I can show what I suggested in Section 2: that the requirements of political justice
are ill-conceived to deal only by themselves with problems of the morality of immigration because
they tend to beg the question of legitimacy. I will not attempt, however, to provide a full account for
the ethics of exclusion. To be excluded from the land and to be excluded from the group have very
different meanings and normative consequences. It is worth noting that exclusion is not one thing
but many. For instance, it may not be equally harmful to exclude low-skilled would-be immigrants
from the land and to exclude highly qualified immigrants from well-paid jobs. These cases and many
others need to be carefully surveyed and catalogued. Many of them will fit into the core case, but I will
not engage in that discussion here. For my purposes here, it is enough to show that the conventional
view neglects to take into account the exclusion from the land as a resource needed for participating in
valuable legitimate institutional relations.7
Consider first one central example of exclusionism that I will call rights-statism. According
to the view defended by Christopher H. Wellman, citizens and residents have a pro tanto right for
6 Famously, Rawls, after A Theory of Justice, eventually came to believe that it is not possible to argue for justice as fairness in
terms of the goodness of justice without making it unacceptable for the citizens of a pluralistic society since citizens have
different and irreconcilable ideas about what is good and just (Song 2012, pp. 153–61). The Rawlsean problem of justification
of a theory of justice shifts then from an argument of the justness undertaken by a comprehensive theory of morality
(Rawls 1971, p. 4) to an argument of the legitimacy of justice as fairness capable to elucidate: “in the light of what reasons and
values—of what kind of a conception of justice—can citizens legitimately exercise that coercive power over one another?”
(Rawls 2001b, p. 41). That is why, for that specific problem as framed by Rawls, justice and legitimacy overlap.
7 Many thanks to an anonymous reader for raising this problem to me.
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political self-determination (Wellman 2008). This kind of control that communities of residents and
citizens exercise in their self-regarding affairs must entail political rights of association, which in turn
also entail analytically a legitimate right to be free from unwanted associations, such as those with
unwanted would-be migrants. As an exclusionist view, rights-statism does not deny stringent duties of
global justice.
There are many reasons to resist Wellman’s argument (Van der Vossen 2015; Hidalgo 2012;
Fine 2010). For one, political self-determination does not necessarily entail permissibility of any
particular policy, including policy about immigration controls (Hidalgo 2012, p. 16). Therefore, the
putative analytical connection between rights of political self-determination and rights of exclusion
is not obtained. Furthermore, rights-statism does not establish any kind of position of dominion
over the land from which defenders of exclusionism wish to exclude nonmembers. Here is the
flaw: we can accept that there is a pro tanto case for exclusion from the group without accepting the
further claim that there is a pro tanto case for exclusion from the land or the territory (Carens 1987;
Simmons 2001; Fine 2010). This means that the proper ground to assess immigration policy should
begin with a resource-based justification of their claims for exclusion from the homeland. Without it,
the option to dismiss the basic interest in immigrating would-be migrants may be at least questionable
because those enforcing exclusion will not have a privileged position of dominion over the homeland.
However, this is too quick because these objections only show that rights-statism is inconclusive.
The possibility to supplement forms of exclusionism may come from associative obligations. Some of
the relationships we establish with each other are special in the sense that, without actually providing
our consent, we engage in reiterative valuable interactions that are instrumentally valuable. If the
history of these interactions becomes more intimate and creates trust, cooperation, and interdependence,
then these relationships may become intrinsically valuable as well, so typically, we find we have reasons
to feel obligated when we play certain roles such as that of a friend or a citizen even if we have never
provided our consent (Scheffler 2002). Accordingly, a state is legitimate when it protects the nation and
the special bond members share associative obligations. To threaten the production of these goods seems
also deeply unjust. Therefore, from the view of associative obligations, exclusionist immigration policy
is legitimate, grounded in reasons of justice. (Miller 2016, p. 27). This view that I call obligations-statism,
has been pursued mostly by liberal nationalists (Tamir 1993; Miller 1995; Gans 1998).
Miller’s interpretation of obligations-statism is attractive because it supplements the case for rights
of associative obligations with a resource-based account of border control of land. According to Miller,
the unique way that a nation develops politically, economically, and socially has a territorial dimension
because culture amalgamates with the land in a way that will be extremely harmful to members of
the nation to be deprived from the space where their own culture is territorially incarnated. Therefore,
it is not the fact of individual ownership that grounds territorial rights; rather, it is the fact that a
community mixes its own culture with the soil in a way that it is not detachable without causing an
enormous collective harm (Miller 2007, p. 218).8
There are many challenges raised against obligation-statist arguments for immigration control.
For instance, it seems that nationalist protection of culture by means of state institutions seems to
accomplish just the opposite: the coercive imposition of a form of unauthentic official culture devised
by state officials instead of organically conducted by members of the cultural group (Camacho 2017).
However, the main problem with the nationalist account of territorial control is that the deontic
force of a state’s claims is grounded on the idea that cultural self-determination may be necessarily
8 According to Locke, a state’s dominion over territory is a consequence or derives from member’s prior ownership rights.
Members with private property transfer certain property-powers to the state in exchange, at least, for the protection of
their property by the state. In this way, owners cease to have absolute dominion over their property and states end up
with certain dominion over a territory, establishing a group or an association of co-owners (Locke [1689] 1988, pp. 288–348;
Simmons 2001). The main problem with this account is its historic implausibility. It seems descriptively false that acquisition,
property, and transaction could fulfil appropriate criteria of justice that could preserve, in turn, a deontic ground for a state’s
dominion (Blake and Mathias 2008, p. 8).
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connected with land but it is not obvious that the connection between labour-culture mix with collective
jurisdictional rights is necessary or sufficient to ground authority over the land, at least not the kind of
authority that allows immigration exclusion (Stilz 2011, p. 577). A nation may have rights over their
social construction of territory, but they attempt to exclude would-be immigrants from the land and
not from their imagined or socially constructed heartland. This means we can find the same flaw again.
An account of associative obligations that explains how inclusion may be unjust for residents and
citizens simply assumes that immigration controls are legitimately imposed over potential immigrants.
However, even if we grant that the interest of citizens and residents in their territorially located culture
could provide reasons to take control over the process of change of their culture, this hardly will
provide reasons to justify the administration of immigration. Certainly, it does not necessarily provide
reasons for an exclusionist immigration policy (Miller 2005, p. 200).
I will come back to the distinction between territory and land later. For now, let us take a look
at inclusionist arguments. One interpretation of these arguments begins precisely with the intuition
that exclusionists have not sufficiently justified the act of enclosing borders around territories and
later exclude outsiders from those territories. Arash Abizadeh defends what he calls the unbounded
demos thesis: the idea that the bounded demos—the group salienf for exclusionists—has a pre-political
origin in a larger demos that encompasses humanity as a whole (2008, p. 45). The act of constituting
civic borders—giving raise to groups of residents and citizens—is coercive because borders fragment
the original demos invading, in a pervasive and significant way, the autonomy of would-be migrants
(Abizadeh 2008, p. 37). According to liberal and democratic principles, this kind of coercion must
either be removed or justified (Abizadeh 2012, p. 878). Thus, it seems that immigration controls need
to be democratically justified to the very same people they intend to exclude (2008, p. 45).9 This is an
attractive interpretation of inclusionism for many reasons. First, it captures a cosmopolitan challenge
to exclusionism by questioning the assumption of group membership as the locus of the ethics of
immigration (Carens 2013). Secondly, it binds together the interest of members and the interest of
outsiders, so consideration of distributive justice among members will not outcast substantive claims
of justice from nonmembers. Finally, it establishes the requirements of democratic legitimacy—a
paradigmatic form of political justice—over immigration policy.
The most evident problem with Abizade’s instantiation of inclusionism is its implausibility.
The unbounded-demos thesis seems to require that we deem all boundaries illegitimate and that we
start redrawing them from scratch. In turn, however, Abizadeh fails to provide a procedural criterion
for a democratic redrawing of boundaries (Moore 2015, p. 115). This, of course, does not show that
the argument is wrong in itself, but we might want to supplement this account with some idea about
how to think about borders in the world that we live in. In order to face that objection, we could
suggest a softer version of the unbounded-demos thesis. On this version, we waive the requirement of
redrawing boundaries for the more modest indication of shifting the burden of the proof. What the soft
unbounded-demos thesis points out is that exclusion is not analytically justified by popular sovereignty
(a self-determining group) or by jurisdiction (an effective reasonably just state). Any exclusion should
be justified by an independent argument that explains its democratic legitimacy. A corollary of this
perhaps is that border policies should not be unilateral; they must give equal consideration to the
interest of outsiders (Miller 2016, pp. 24–33).
Even this softer interpretation of the inbounded-demos thesis seems deeply problematic. It rests
on a misleading account of coercion. What borders do to outsiders may not require democratic
justification because a single action of coercion by itself is not enough to trigger demands of self-rule
and distributive justice (Blake 2001; Nagel 2005; Cohen and Sabel 2006; Julius 2003; Buchanan 2002).
It is necessary to be involuntarily subjected to a body of pervasive institutional coercion, such as a
9 Note that even open borders structure political jurisdictions, thereby exercising power over both insiders and outsiders
by establishing different jurisdictions, for instance, in the form of their exclusive forms (policies) of regulating property
and transactions.
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system of comprehensive societal norms, in order to give rise to certain relationships, such as the
one established by citizenship. In contrast, what the erection of borders does to nonmembers is
precisely to remove those conditions from them (Miller 2010, pp. 112–17). This conclusion may
seem disappointing, but it is worth noting that something of substantive importance has been gained
with the soft unbounded-demos thesis. What it establishes regarding border control is the normative
requirement of justification. This means that maybe democratic legitimacy is too substantive for the case
of border institutions, but this does not preclude the need for other kinds of legitimation. My three-step
approach may show the path to look for that justification.
Now, recall my interpretative critical thesis about the flaws of these accounts. In Section 2,
I suggested that the contradiction between requirements of justice between exclusionists and
inclusionists is in part the result of the conflation between evaluations of justice and evaluations of
legitimacy. Now, we can see more clearly that these approaches—rights-statism, obligations-statism,
and unbounded-demos thesis—all fail to offer a justification of immigration controls grounded in
an explanatory and justificatory argument that shows the normative connection between groups of
citizens and residents with the land they occupy. These accounts are all inconclusive because they all
fail to consider the diverse ways in which individuals and states establish associations and become
associatively obligated across the land. As we will see, associations and associative obligations can be
established internationally. For one, states are not only atomic associations as Wellman seems to think
or isolated ethical communities as Miller thinks but also territorial entities which have seized land and
which are engaged in complex relations abroad. The hope is that my three-step approach can separate
these different requirements, so we can properly put the interest of members and immigrants in the
same balance.10
4. An Alternative Approach
So far, I have focused solely on criticizing one leading approach to justice in immigration. In this
section, I explain a different way of approaching the issue by reordering some of the preceding
arguments to outline and motivate support for my proposal. My proposal consists of three steps.
In the first stage, instead of asking what justice requires from our border institutions, I would first
ask a logically prior question: what kind of border controls are legitimate; that is, at the level of our
most basic moral principles, what kind of authority is permissible that borders exercise? Secondly,
I ask about the nature of borders. Once we ask about legitimacy of immigration controls. it is easy to
realize that borders are not only lines in the ground or the limits of our institutions but also institutions
themselves. These sui generis institutions are not only domestic and, therefore, subject to standards
of distributive justice for residents and citizens but also international and subject to standards of
international legitimacy that should take the interest of outsiders into account. This account of borders
allows to weigh together social justice and global ethics, so it may show us under what conditions it will
be morally permissible for borders to prioritize the interest of residents and citizens over the interest of
would-be immigrants. Thirdly, once we draw the contours of the legitimate use of border authority,
10 Note that, for exclusionists, the legitimate claim over the land is grounded in claims of distributive justice for residents and
members and, even if domestic justice is a legitimate use of the land as the soft-unbounded demos thesis shows, use of land
needs to be justified to outsiders. However, the unbounded demos thesis fails to provide a procedural criterion to connect
political communities and land. Both accounts of exclusionism and inclusionism conflate claims of justice among members
of a group—the citizenry or humanity—with legitimate claims over the land. As a result, in each case—for exclusionism and
inclusionism—the focus on claims of justice is misplaced. On the one hand, inclusionism may be right when it stresses the
need of justification of borders but conflates the just distribution of land with the legitimacy of democratic requirements.
As a result, it also fails to engage in the discussion about the nature of borders and what is the proper relationship between
borders around land, political communities, and immigrants. On the other, without an account that explains the claim that
citizens and residents may have over the land and an account that analyses the nature of borders, it may be difficult to
determine the limits of the priority that borders may grant to residents and citizens over the interest of potential immigrants.
Exclusionism captures one important sense in which the idea of groups that protect justice is valuable: states, nations, or
peoples entail value as an expression of our legitimate basic rights and as the reflection of the relations of justice we establish.
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we can again ask whether it is appropriate to distribute the right to exclude immigrants according to
standards of distributive international justice by means of an international border institution.
4.1. Step 1: The Normative Prior Question of Borders
To analyse what would be a fair consideration of just claims of inclusion or exclusion, one has to
start at the level of our most fundamental moral principles by asking what does morality require of
border policy? When is it acceptable to favour the interest either of residents and citizens on one side
or would-be immigrants on the other? This prior question, I believe, is the question of the legitimacy
of immigration control.
Step 1 follows from a number of arguments and ideas I invoked before. Rights-statism and
obligations-statism showed us that political communities have a right to control and administrate
admissions even though that right does not translate into a right for exclusion. Soft unbounded-demos
thesis stressed that that kind of control needs to be nonetheless justified. Now, we can ask the following:
When does the case of borders require evaluations of legitimacy rather than evaluations of justice?
Under what criteria do certain circumstances require the virtue of legitimacy? An influential account
of legitimacy is offered by Bernard Williams. This account begins with the assumption that de facto
effective power is not enough to justify authority. To ask about the moral quality of authority is to
assess if those who claim authority are in some way justified to do so. Do their claims of authority
make any sense to those subjected to it? Will I be morally wrong if I choose to challenge that authority?
How could authority ever make sense if authority clashes with everyone’s nature as free and equal
individuals? The answer to this kind of questions lies in the establishment of a regime that secures the
stability of some order for protection, safety, trust, and cooperation (Williams 2005, p. 3). Authority is
justified or legitimate when it makes sense as a sort of plausible and credible solution to this problem
of politics.
Now, according to Williams, we can distinguish meeting this requirement for justification from
meeting other political virtues such as distributive justice or political justice even if sometimes these
requirements overlap with each other (Williams 2005, p. 4). For instance, it is of course possible, as
in the case of the domestic basic structure of a liberal society that the most plausible way of meeting
the demands of justification, is to appeal to political justice, fairness, or distributive justice. However,
the same circumstances arise in which the only way to justify political power is to avoid reference to
liberal political virtues or at least a justification could be coherently articulated in an attractive way
without reference to such virtues. For instance, when a social group has been historically discriminated
against and excluded from wealth and opportunities, it may be deeply unjust for applicants for a
job with merits to be dismissed in favour of reparative quotas. However, the legitimacy of social
and political institutions needs to be re-established for members of the discriminated social group if
social institutions are to exercise political power over them without harming their dignity even if this
means to unjustly deprive some applicants from the dominant group from opportunities they deserve.
If instead we avoid reference to standards of legitimacy, we have to face the unpalatable conclusion
that giving the job to any of them is both just and unjust at the same time.
To be sure, the connection between authority and legitimacy is often posed too as a dilemma of
justification. Legitimate authority is the best chance human beings have for the protection of their most
basic rights, but at the same time and almost for the very same reasons, the establishment of authority
is the worst threat to the protection of those rights (Williams 2005; Dworkin 2013). This means that
legitimacy is not a closed evaluation or adjudication. Instead, we need to continuously assess the
legitimacy of institutions because the very same institutions that, at some point, are part of the solution
(of a given institutional problem) may easily turn into part of the problem they are supposed to fix in
the first place. All things being equal, it is claimed that the authority that immigration controls exercise
is needed to protect the basic rights of residents and citizens, but at the same time, immigration controls
could easily threaten those very same rights. For instance, immigrants may depredate government
services without proportionate contribution in taxes (Freiman and Hidalgo 2016, p. 12), but at the same
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time, immigration controls may illegitimately curtail the freedom of association of citizens who want
to share the house with foreign nationals (Steiner 2018, p. 140).
Now, we may raise an alternative normative start: We beguine by distinguishing concerns of
legitimacy and concerns of justice. If the general problem of borders is to determine what kind of
borders liberal democracies ought to have or, rather, what morality requires from border controls, then
this raises two particular problems: first, to justify the exclusive control over the administration of
borders (the problem of legitimacy of borders) and, second, to specify how this control ought to be
exercised (the problem of justice of borders). Once we divide these levels of analysis like this, we may
see how it makes sense to understand borders as sui generis institutions domestic and international: we
can distinguish between the institutional entitlement to exercise dominion over borders internationally
from the way this entitlement is exercised here at home. In general, while an illegitimate state is not
entitled to exercise any border control, a legitimate state may exercise many kinds of border control
that we can assess according to justice.11 However, how do we know that, for the case of immigration
controls, the requirements for justification are different from the requirements of other political virtues
such as justice? In order to determine, that we must turn to the nature of borders.
4.2. Step 2: A New Normative Conception of Borders
Political theory often misrepresents international borders because it takes them into account merely
as lines on the ground or as the outer limit of domestic institutions marking out jurisdictional boundaries.
This certainly makes sense from the point of view of exclusionism and political justice because borders
will serve only the purpose to contain the inner institutions and to keep everything else out as the state
or the community sees it fit. However, as we saw following soft unbounded-demos thesis, immigration
controls are an exercise of power that needs to be justified and borders are institutions that carry on that
exercise. If this is true, then borders are not jurisdictional limits but institutions themselves. Therefore,
we can ask about the institutional requisite function of borders and pick up from there what borders
should be according to those requisite functions. The requisite function of borders is conventionally
to administer the flow of people and goods from one state to the other (Barry and Goodin 1992, p. 6),
but for the case of complex liberal democracies, this entails not only customs and immigration offices
but also airports, sea ports, mail offices, embassies, consulates, international affairs bureaus, etc.12
This means that, in order to fulfil their requisite functions, borders have become over the past 100 years
a highly complex and specialized set of institutions devoted precisely to administering the territorial,
institutional, and populational limits between states (Camacho 2016).
However, this is not enough to understand the nature of borders. A good description about
international relations should tell us not only something about the institutional nature of states as
units but also something else about the institutional nature of the international system as a whole
(Waltz [1979] 2010). This means that, from an institutional and international perspective, borders are
not only institutions of the state but also international institutions. We can in fact distinguish borders
from the rest of the institutions of the state because borders, as opposed to basic institutions—such as
the executive or the judiciary—are the kind of institutions that exercise political power systematically
over both insiders and outsiders. As such, borders are sui generis institutions because they are at the
same time domestic, for instance, when they issue passports or let in imports, and international, for
instance, in the case of consulates and embassies, when they administrate the relationships between
neighbouring countries. Note that this would mean that borders not only administrate the flow of
people but also administrate other aspects of international relations such as the flow of commodities,
currencies, and services and perhaps also cultures, languages, influence, and other intangible goods.
11 Legitimacy is a piecemeal evaluation. Once this account develops further, it should take into account matters of degree, but
for simplicity, I focus in the general case.
12 See (Valenzuela and Camacho).
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From a systematic institutional perspective, in order to perform their requisite functions, borders
of one country should interact with the borders of other countries, in fact intertwining in a net or
system of border institutions regionally and, in the case of affluent liberal democracies, even globally.
The more exchange and flow border institutions need to administrate, the more globally interconnected
borders are with border institutions of other countries. This kind of complexity also implies that
borders are not a unique institution. Not even international border tolls are part of the same institution.
Different border institutions are created depending on with what country a relationship has been
established. For instance, Spanish border institutions with Morocco are different from Spanish border
institutions with France precisely because border institutions with Morocco reflect the uniqueness of the
relationship with these two countries. This also means that two countries do not need to be neighbours
to have a border. When I board a plane and descend in Frankfurt, I am subjected to the immigration
considerations Germany has established for Mexicans, and this amounts to being subjected to the
authority of the German–Mexican border institution even if this border is somehow virtual.
The last century has seen a fast development of border institutions, turning them into a
well-established global set of rules and offices that have established a basic institutional structure all
around the globe. The exact character of this system though is unclear. It obviously is not analogous
to the domestic basic structure of liberal democracies, but we know that at least this system makes
international cooperation possible and that sometimes it is permeable to moral reasons such as those
contained in the doctrine of human rights. In fact, there is a chance that just and legitimate borders
administrate a great deal of what we call international relations. Under my account, perhaps even
public affairs bureaus may be considered part of border institutions. I will say a bit more about the
normative nature of borders in the next section. For now, it is important to come back to the problem
of legitimacy.
According to this account, borders are a system of international complex pluralistic institutions
that acquire their special identity from the specific relationship they embody. There are at least two
sources of legitimacy coherent with this account: the relationship that gives them identity and the
claims over the land they enclose. First, borders are legitimate when they perform their requisite
functions, and under this account, that means that a specific border (between two given countries)
is legitimate when its policy (including but not limited to immigration policy) reflects the actual
relationship between these two given countries. For instance, this means that, if these two countries
have an intensive relationship in terms of cultural, commercial, and diplomatic exchange and one
of the two countries excludes citizens and residents of the other in a way that does not make sense
according to that relationship, then the exclusionary policy is illegitimate in a way that devaluates the
legitimacy of the border institution that sustains it.
Second, as we saw in Section 3, exclusionary policy needs to be grounded in a legitimate claim
over the land. If a country does not have a legitimate claim over the land it occupies, then it is difficult
to see how or to what extent their borders can be legitimate. In order to perform the exclusion of
would-be immigrants legitimately, borders must logically presuppose a previous source of legitimacy:
the legitimate authority, legitimate dominion, or monopolistic control over the land in a way that
both jurisdiction and dominion coincide with the borders. Rights to establish borders need to include
the right to establish a jurisdiction and the right to occupy that land for the purpose of establishing
political communities with the power to exclude would-be immigrants. Jurisdiction alone cannot
justify exclusionary rights. Many accounts argue since Kant that a political community gains rights
over the territory as it manages to create and sustain legitimate and just institutions (Moore 2015;
Ypi 2013; Stilz 2011; Simmons 2001). However, what is under review is the right of that community
to establish those institutions there in the first place. I will also come back to this problem in the
last section.
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4.3. Step 3: Just Exclusions
Once we make sure borders may exercise their immigration authority legitimately, we need to
assess their policies according to standards of justice. As we saw in the last section, this assessment
cannot be constructed only from the point of view of domestic social justice. Of course, borders
protect the interests and rights of citizens and residents, but as my analysis of exclusionist accounts
reveal, evaluations of domestic social justice do not exhaust the morality of borders and immigration
controls. One suggestion to balance claims of global justice with claims of domestic social justice within
international legitimacy is the creation of an institution capable of distributing rights of exclusion for
local border institutions.
Javier Hidalgo notes that states’ decisions regarding immigration restrictions may be morally
questionable (Hidalgo 2013) and sometimes harmful (Hidalgo 2016, pp. 153–54). If this is true, Hidalgo
argues that states may have moral reasons to transfer at least some of their decision-making authority
over immigration to international immigration institutions. States should join a world migration
organization that establishes an institutional multilateral framework for negotiating migration flows
between states (Hidalgo 2016; Bhagwati 2003). Note that the existence of such a World Migration
Organization transforms again the problem of exclusion of would-be immigrants into a distributive
problem. Is this sound?
Hidalgo’s proposal is problematic in terms of international legitimacy as there are very weak
incentives for the creation and continuation of an organization of this kind (Hidalgo 2016, pp. 148–50).
One reason is that policy makers have negative incentives coming from local voters. Often, it is easier
for irresponsible or short-sighted politicians to blame last comers about social problems, and at the
same time, voters often prefer to form false beliefs and to blame immigrants for social problems even
if in both cases they lack any convincing evidence to do so.13 Secondly, the benefits from relaxing
immigration controls tend to favour worse-off countries instead of rich ones, at least in the short term.
Note that, under my normative account, borders are understood already as a system of domestic
and international institutions. Once border institutions fulfill not only the demands of domestic social
justice but also those of international legitimacy, the states with legitimate borders may find reason to
establish institutional forms of international cooperation regarding borders and immigration policy.
To be sure, the requisite function of border institutions—here and now—already is to administrate and
control the flow of people and goods and, in doing so, to a great extent to administrate the relationship
between countries. When one country establishes trade, diplomatic, or other kind of relations with
others, it means (i) that their societies acquire certain moral obligations determined by the strength of
the relationship and (ii) that these obligations may give rise to special institutional requirements by
means of consent in the form of agreements or treaties between these two countries. Therefore, border
institutions gain legitimacy when they reflect the particular relationship between countries in terms of
consented duties, associative duties, and the character of the relationship as a whole. However, border
policy unfolds not only in bilateral forms. When states need to administrate the border institutions
and immigration controls of a group of countries in cooperative terms, it will make sense to coordinate
that effort in an institutional fashion.
Suppose a cluster of liberal democracies establish a legitimate system of borders that reflects
accurately their consented and associative obligations. Then, it may be plausible that they decide to
disincentivize defectors by organizing their system of borders under a centralized institution such
as the one described by Hidalgo. This, of course, changes the nature of the problem of immigration
controls back to the kind of problem that can be assessed by a conception of distributive justice, but it
does this in a way that the distribution of exclusionary rights may be just because it is the result of a
13 For the claim that majorities often blame immigrants for social problems without empirical evidence, see (Miller 2009, p. 36).
For the claim that blaming immigrants for social problems is often wrong, see (Fromentin 2013). Cited in (Hidalgo 2016,
p. 149).
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legitimate use of institutional authority when this authority comes from a legitimate system of borders.
The problem arises because, in reality, we know that, seldom, immigration restrictions embody the
associative obligations established by the actual interaction between two countries.14 For instance,
in North America, Canada, the USA, and México have been engaged in deep trade and cultural and
diplomatic relations, yet immigration restrictions do not necessarily reflect the level of engagement,
cooperation, and interdependence between these three states.
5. International Legitimacy and the Legitimacy of Borders
These sections complete my outline. The account here does, of course, need to be developed
further. Most obviously, as I said in the introduction, my account of borders and the legitimate claims
over the land needs to be given substantive content. As a result, steps 2 and 3 can only be endorsed in
a provisional sense. When applying the approach outlined above, one must be careful to not simply
move from the fact that borders already exercise power in certain ways to the conclusion that those
instances of international power are justified. However, despite this, there are two important objections
to my approach. First, it could be argued that the distinction between justice and legitimacy is trivial or
at least not informative. What I call legitimacy can be properly described as a form of justice. Second,
international legitimacy of borders has little or nothing to do with immigration policy. Typically, we
do not assess the legitimacy of borders of other states based on the immigration policy as a criterion.15
Let us consider first the conceptual analysis objection. It could be argued that the distributive
claims of international ethics (claims between states) may be reducible to the distributive claim of
global justice (claims between all individuals), making my account trivial.16 Sometimes, the distinction
between different things we call justice may be a mere linguistic or terminological disagreement
between a core understanding of justice and some penumbra controversial cases in very much the
same way that astronomers discuss whether it is appropriate to use the concept of planet for the case
of Pluto (Dworkin 2013, p. 5). For instance, we can agree or disagree whether family is an appropriate
object of distributive justice. Some thought that family was too private to be considered an object of
social justice, and some others thought that family was the source of many social injustices we ought to
consider publicly.17 However, that discussion did not involve picking up one concept or conception of
justice over other alternatives; instead, the discussion needed to clarify whether a shared conception of
justice applied to a controversial case such as family. Now, some will be tempted to suggest that the
distinction I am proposing between concerns of legitimacy and concerns of justice in the international
realm is merely terminological. They will insist that we can agree or disagree about the question of
whether it would be appropriate for theoretical and applied purposes to include global justice within
14 Under the complex account of borders, associative obligations tend to be multilateral because the normative evaluation
is comparative. The border of one country establishes interactions with several other borders, and the nature of these
interactions could be assessed in comparative terms. Consider an example. There are three democracies in the north part of
one continent. C, U, and M are engaged in a strong and deep relationship with each other; they have established terms for
free trade and deep diplomatic and cultural relations. They are also engaged in institutional cooperation regarding key
subjects such as security, development, and administration. As a result, they plan and design together their institutions and
policies. Country U treats C as its partner, thus administrating border institutions relative to C accordingly. U welcomes
C’s nationals and their foreign affairs offices, and other institutions exercise political power in order to accommodate the
close relationship with C, yet U treats M in a different way. U does not welcome M’s nationals and also places other kinds
of restrictions on the rest of M’s border institutions. Overall, U treats C as a friend and partner and M as a subordinate.
According to the complex account of borders, U wrongs M and its habitants because it has established a relationship with
M that has moral character, and as such, it entails certain obligations. U has grown into a complex and deep relationship
with both C and M. This deep relationship creates associative responsibilities that are not exhausted by consent, yet U only
consents to acknowledging those obligations for the case of C. The lack of explicit consent in the case of M, however, does
not cancel the associative obligations that U has acquired with M through its practices. When U engages in a deep and
complex relationship with M yet decides to exclude M’s nationals, it undermines the ground of legitimacy insofar as it
exploits and subjects M’s nationals by benefiting from a relationship with them but mistreating them at the same time.
15 I am in debt to an anonymous reviser who suggested to me this objection.
16 I am grateful to an anonymous reader that raised this objection.
17 See (Young 1990) for discussion.
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the more general conception of distributive justice, but in the end, that is a terminological query about
a controversial instance. I believe the distinction I am stressing is not merely terminological.
I follow Dworkin when I reject that all the conceptual disagreements of this kind are always
criterial or semantic. There are certain problems that require an interpretative approach such as
determining what morality requires in certain circumstances characterized by the lack of special
relationships or relationships of partiality. In this case, inclusionists have assumed that immigration
problems require accounts of global justice that establish claims between individuals from different
political communities because there is no global community. However, this simply neglects the fact
that borders are intergovernmental institutions that potentially could establish forms of international
governance over immigration restrictions. This kind of institutions and the governance they will
produce in the close future will constrain in turn the claims of global justice that immigrants residents
and citizens could press against each other.
If my interpretative thesis is sound, the tension between exclusionists and inclusionists is not merely
semantic. Exclusionists take justice as an evaluative concern by asking what normative conclusions we
can extrapolate about immigration considering how immigration policy is conventionally understood
as largely discretionary. In contrast, inclusionists take justice as determining whether any immigration
control is right or wrong. For defenders of exclusionism, justice is a remedial virtue of institutions
here and now, and for defenders of inclusionism, justice is a context-independent value about what
is right. In contrast, interpretative moral questions such as who gets to decide whether two persons
from different nationalities who love each other could live together in the same place or what is the
limit of immigration authority regarding the movement of highly qualified people cannot be answered
by discussing the scope of justice in a semantic way. For such a question, we need an interpretative
dynamic account that allows the division of labour between different levels of analysis in order to
determine first what kind of uses of political power are morally permissible for borders and later what
legitimate uses of immigration authority are just. My three-step approach offers at least three layers of
analysis that supplements the standard account. The standard account assesses immigration policy
according to the interests of some residents and citizens only, but under the three-step approach, that
assessment needs to be weighed against the international legitimacy of border institutions.
The second objection however stresses that typically international legitimacy has little or nothing
to do with immigration policy.18 We know this is true because the legitimacy of borders is more
obviously linked with territorial disputes. The moment borders cease to be accepted by the consent of
parties, there are important consequences. Conflict arises (armed, diplomatic, or otherwise) as was the
case in the Atacama region between Perú, Chile, and Bolivia. Recently, Bolivian president Evo Morales
decided to break the border treaties signed by both countries. He filed a case with the International
Court of Justice on 24 April 2013, but the international court, following the principle of uti possidetis,
did not change the borders formerly established by the previous treaty. However, it is not clear
what would be the implications of my approach regarding noncompliance and “illegitimate border
authority”. As I said before at the beginning of this section, my account of the legitimacy of borders
needs to be developed further. For now, the consequences are merely normative.19 For instance, it is
important to note two important things about territorial legitimacy. First, territorial legitimacy is not
alien or unrelated to immigration controls. It is quite the opposite, as we saw; if my critical objection is
sound, the possibility of grounding legitimate exclusionist immigration controls depends, to a certain
extent, on the possibility of establishing a certain form of legitimate dominion or moral claim over the
land. Second, the complex account of borders I am proposing is neither prescriptive nor descriptive.
It is normative in a realistic fashion. It captures some features and good practices of borders of liberal
democracies and offers an interpretation of their functions that is in accordance with our moral claims
18 I am in debt to an anonymous reviewer for raising this objection.
19 Many thanks to an anonymous reviewer for pressing me on this.
Soc. Sci. 2019, 8, 238 15 of 19
and principles. Therefore, the fact that the legitimacy of borders has here and now little to do with the
legitimacy of immigration controls is not necessarily an objection if the interpretative account shows
that immigration controls and legitimacy of borders should be connected.
Note that this shows a shift in the approach. Previously, discussing assessments of justice and
legitimacy, I have proceeded by means of conceptual analysis to try to find the most coherent way to
make sense of claims, concerns, and standards regarding exclusion of would-be immigrants. With my
account of borders, I sought to think about border institutions as they are here and now according to
an interpretation of their best traits and practices as if we were going from the ground up. The hope is
that the approach from legitimacy of borders serves to outline an alternative way of thinking about
rights to exclude would-be immigrants.20
One example of this realistic normative approach is precisely the untheorized relationship between
political communities, institutions—in this case, borders—and the land. As a matter of fact, we currently
lack a good explanation of how borders can legitimately seize a part of the earth, yet we continue with
the normative account of borders in the hope that we can find good reasons to understand claims over
the land that are coherent with our concerns about legitimacy and justice. This needs to be unpacked.
One influential view holds that peoples may hold legitimate control over territories when they
demonstrate they have legitimate and just manifestations of political self-determination. Peoples
are communities that share a distinct political identity which derives from a collective mobilization
for creating and maintaining legitimate institutions of justice. In contrast with nations that are
sustained and protected by the power of the state, political identity is sustained organically by the
characteristically social mobilization and agency that peoples have in contrast with other groups
and other forms of collective control (Moore 2015, p. 50). According to Margaret Moore, borders
should be drawn around groups that meet the criteria of legitimate peoplehood because peoplehood
generates a right of occupation of the land. These heartlands generate a qualified and pro tanto right
to control borders, including the power to exclude potential migrants, justified as an extension of
jurisdictional authority and (like jurisdictional authority) in terms of the moral value of collective
self-determination.21
The problem with this account is that it misrepresents the kind of political relationships that seem
more important in contemporary liberal democracies by attributing jurisdictional rights to peoples
instead of acknowledging that, in the conditions familiar to us, states are the only agents establishing
jurisdictions. Of course, Moore could answer that her work is also a normative account of territory,
but her account also begs the normative question because what we are challenging is precisely the
entitlement over the land, including all territorial rights such as jurisdiction. In order to see this, three
distinctions should be in place. First, following Moore, we can distinguish states from peoples and
we know that we have more peoples than states, so presumably, there are several peoples inside a
single state. Second, Moore also accepts the distinction between rights over the land and territorial
rights. Land is all the surface not covered with water, while territories are social constructs. Typically,
property rights are applied to land while jurisdiction is a territorial right. Finally, we can distinguish
legal rights from moral rights. Any jurisdiction establishes the validity over a territory of several legal
rights and legal rules, while moral rights are stablished by status or by certain basic human interests in
the sense that they apply to all jurisdictions.
Now, note that, when she attributes to peoples the capacity to establish jurisdiction, this leaves
unanswered the question of how peoples acquire the right to reject outsiders while only establishing
that peoples acquire the right to impose valid law over a territory. We know this because jurisdictions
tend to be inclusive rather than exclusive. For instance, when an immigrant crosses the border
20 About this kind of approach, see (Walzer 1983, chp. II); “Membership” and, more recently, (Carens 2013, pp. 8–13).
21 Of course, the resultant exclusionary rights are qualified rights because they have to be pursued in ways consistent with
basic human rights, for instance, by being accompanied by policies that address serious deprivation in those parts of the
world which we typically think of as “migrant-sending societies”.
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without permission, we do not assume that they are legally or morally permitted to rob banks or to
seize property insofar as we believe that regardless of their migratory status, they are subject to our
jurisdiction. Of course, we could argue that, in our jurisdiction, there is a law that says “non-citizens
must be kept out until a permission to come is given to them”, but this does not solve the normative
challenge since what is under scrutiny here is the moral right of states or any political agent to establish
and enforce those kinds of rules. Furthermore, Moore’s manoeuvre has very unpalatable consequences.
Suppose we accept that peoples have territorial rights and Yucatecos (inhabitants of the state of
Yucatan) in Mexico qualify as a people following Moore’s characterization. One day, they wish to resist
Chilangos (inhabitants of México city) from moving to their beautiful city of Mérida and they change
the law in order to prohibit the immigration of Chilangos. Under what grounds can we challenge
that? Coherence with Moore’s rationale will suggest that we could not, and if Yucatecos are serious
about their rejection of Chilangos, they will have a qualified pro tanto right to resist their immigration
tendencies as much as mobilized groups can resist gentrification. Therefore, it will be very difficult to
explain how exclusionary rights could be transferred or administrated by the state, as dissenters could
always challenge states’ authority over immigration laws.
It seems that the legitimacy of immigration controls is, after all, necessarily connected with the
international legitimacy of borders. Moore’s basic right of occupation explains the need for certain
space and jurisdiction, but it cannot justify current borders because it only identifies peoples’ heartlands.
The lack of capacity to normatively draw borders results in a lack of grounds for exclusion of would-be
immigrants. After all, as we saw, land, as opposed to jurisdiction, is not an idea, a system of rules,
or a social construction. Land is a scarce resource that not only allows opportunities for physical
survival, for instance, when we farm it or build refuge from the elements, but also makes possible
opportunities for organization that develop collective valuable forms of discharging individual duties
and institutional mutual care. However, it is not clear what reasons could be invoked for excluding
would-be immigrants from it, particularly when these immigrants wish to cooperate in the production
of such goods.
6. Conclusions
Nothing that I have said here implies that the core intuition behind inclusionism is untrue
or conceptually incoherent. Defenders of inclusionism must realize that both exclusionism and
inclusionism constitute efforts to make sense of claims of political justice.22 Exclusionism focuses
mostly on the problem of justice for members and leaves the problem of the legitimacy of immigration
controls (justification of land and land-control) completely underdetermined. Inclusionism, on the
other hand, turns the problem on its head: whereas exclusionism tries to determine what justice
requires from border restrictions, inclusionism seeks to determine what kind of political justice is
required for a world without borders that requires the distribution of land and the redrawing of borders.
While inclusionism points to political arrangements that are yet to be envisioned, exclusionism works
under the assumption that states are the only agents capable of playing this role in any meaningful
way. Exclusionism also assumes that states are legitimate when they are able to establish relationships
of justice among members, but inclusionism shows that states’ legitimacy is incomplete unless it
acquires legitimacy beyond borders. But both assume without argument what is being challenged: the
legitimacy or illegitimacy of exclusion from the land administrated by immigration institutions that
are both local and international.
22 As we saw, this means that exclusionism and inclusionism are different conceptions of justice in immigration, but I assume
both have a good idea about a concept of justice they want to satisfy. Exclusionism seems to be mainly concerned about
how to satisfy the substantive claims of citizens, while inclusionism seems to be mainly concerned about which political
arrangements may satisfy the substantive claims of everyone. About the difference between concept and conceptions of
justice, see (Rawls 2001a, p. 5). For concepts of justice, see (Cohen 2009, p. 279).
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To be clear, I do not categorically reject exclusionist’s or inclusionist’s core concerns about justice.
Instead, I insist that the way they frame their claims of justice tends to simply assume what we must
justify: the kind of legitimate institutional control over the land (borders) and the land itself that makes
normatively possible justifying the exclusion of would-be immigrants. Therefore, my suggestion is to
take a step back from the traditional understanding of political justice and to assess separately the
different normative requirements that pose the problem of immigration controls and policy. I have
suggested to take this in three stages.
First, we appeal to the conceptual difference between legitimacy and justice even if justice contains
democratic legitimacy of some sort. This is because, in the second stage, we appeal to the sui generis
nature of borders as domestic and international complex institutions. From the domestic point of view,
borders should accommodate requirements of justice, even political justice, but from outside, borders
should coincide with requirements of international legitimacy. In a nutshell, the requirements of
political theory and the theory of international relations must appear to be coherent for the case of
border controls. My account at the third stage then establishes an institutional mechanism to connect
exclusionist’s claims of justice for the interest of citizens and residents with inclusionist’s project of
global emancipation and equality. Exclusionary rights may instead be distributed by an international
or global institution of some sort according to standards of global justice.
However, I leave unsolved the problem of legitimate claims over the land, and under my account,
the legitimacy of borders, to a certain extent, rely on this other kind of legitimacy over a physical
resource such as the earth. Perhaps Kantians are right when they claim that only when a just system of
international relations has been constructed may states claim that kind of right grounding as a result
their exclusionary claims. Be that as it may, I believe it is somehow explanatory to be sure about the
possible sources of exclusionary rights. They should come from a normative explanation of borders
sensible to ethical considerations in international relations and from claims over the land when used
for establishing relationships that allow us to discharge our moral obligations and to find our rights
protected by others. I leave this last problem for another paper.
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